







In case of a merger or an acquisition, a tort liability that arises from the seller’s
conduct is often imposed on the buyer through the doctrine of successor liability. If the
buyer has as much information about the potential liability as the seller, the ﬁr s tb e s ti s
achieved: all gains from acquisition are realized and the seller takes the eﬃcient amount
of precaution. However, when the seller has more information about the potential
liability than the buyer, there could be too little acquisition, too little incentive on
the seller, or both. The court can increase the successor liability to improve welfare.
We show that imposing a higher damages against the surviving seller is better than
increasing the liability against the buyer.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
After a tort-feasor has engaged in a potentially harmful activity, it is often not until many
years after, that the victims discover the extent of the damage. Manufacturers sell or use
products, that create health problems on the consumers or the employees, but the extent
of the damage is ascertained only after many years, as evidenced, for instance, in asbestos
and tobacco litigations. Similarly, the consequences of an environmental pollution are not
only diﬃcult to measure but also can become apparent only after an extensive delay. The
problem is that by the time the damage has been discovered and estimated, the initial
tort-feasor is often out of existence, either through a merger or an acquisition by another
company or due to bankruptcy and subsequent liquidation. Suppose the initial tort-feasor
has been acquired by another company. Should the victims be allowed to recover from the
surviving company, even though the company has done nothing wrong against the victims
and was not even aware of the problem at the time of the acquisition?
The tort law does allow the victims to recover from the surviving company. When
the ownership of the tort-feasor has been transferred to a new company, e.g., through a
1stock-for-stock acquisition, the law deems the buying entity as the owner of the original
company. But, even in the case where the buying company has only bought the tort-
feasor’s assets and has explicitly disavowed against the future liability, the courts often still
allow the victims to recover from the buyer. The preliminary analysis has concluded that
such successor liability provides eﬃcient deterrence against the initial tort-feasor. When the
buying company is aware of the extent of the liability, the acquisition price will decrease to
reﬂect the liability and provide the optimal deterrence against the tort-feasor. This analysis
simplistic, however. The assumption that the victims or the government authorities are not
aware of the extent of the damage implies that, at the time of the sale, the selling company
probably has more information about its initial conduct and the potential liability than the
buyer.
This paper shows that in the presence of information asymmetry, successor liability no
longer ensures the eﬃcient allocation of resources. Asymmetric information creates two
types of ineﬃciencies. First, not all acquisitions are consummated even though there is
ad e ﬁnite gains from the acquisitions. Second, because the price may become insensitive
to the size of the liability, it fails to provide the eﬃcient level of incentive to the selling
company. When the size of the merger gain is relatively large compared to the potential
liability, the second ineﬃciency will be more prevalent, whereas when relatively small, the
ﬁrst ineﬃciency will be more likely. The paper, then, shows that by adjusting the size of the
successor liability, i.e., by imposing higher or lower damages against the surviving company,
the court can induce a better equilibrium. There could be a trade-oﬀ, however. Raising the
liability can provide better deterrence against the seller at the risk of losing more beneﬁcial
acquisitions. Nonetheless, the paper shows that imposing a higher damages against the
surviving seller is better than increasing the liability against the buyer.
2T h e M o d e l
There are one buyer and one seller, both risk neutral. In the ﬁrst period (t =1 ), the seller
decides on the level of precaution, e ∈ [0,e],a tac o s to fψ(e). We assume that ψ0 > 0,
ψ00 > 0, ψ0(0) = 0,a n dψ0(e)=+ ∞.T h e l e v e l o f e ﬀort determines the probability (or
likelihood), p(e),o fa na c c i d e n t( e L). The accident imposes a damage of L (> 0) onto a
(future) victim and a higher level of precaution by the seller decreases the probability of
the accident: p0 < 0 and p00 > 0. In the second period (t =2 ), the seller learns whether
there will be an accident in the future or not, i.e., the seller learns the future realization of
L. I nt h et h i r dp e r i o d( t =3 ), a buyer appears with probability one. We consider two
cases: the buyer or the seller makes a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer to the other company. The
buyer values the company at Vb − e L while the seller values at Vs − e L. We assume, for now,
that Vb − Vs >L , so that the potential merger gains is larger than the size of the liability
and the seller will not bankrupt due to the liability, i.e., Vs >L . In the fourth period
(t =4 ), the accident is discovered and the victim costlessly recovers damages of L from the
surviving corporation. We assume that there is no time discount.
22.1 The First Best
Assuming that the victim will be wholly compensated, the ﬁr s tb e s tr e q u i r e st h a tt h eﬁrm to
be sold to the buyer with probability one and the seller to make precautionary investment
to maximize Vb − p(e)L − ψ(e). The maximization yields p0(e∗)L + ψ0(e∗)=0 , where
we denote e∗ as the ﬁrst best level of precaution. With the signs on the second order
derivatives, the second order condition is satisﬁed: p00(e∗)+ψ00(e∗) < 0. We assume that
0 <p (e∗) <p (0) < 1.N o w , s u p p o s e a t t =3 , before making an acquisition oﬀer, the buyer
perfectly observes whether there has been an accident or not. Then, the buyer will oﬀer
Vs if there will be no liability and Vs − L if there will be liability in the future. Hence,
acquisition always occurs. Given the buyer’s conditional oﬀers, in the ﬁrst period, the seller
will maximize E(πs)=p(e)(Vs −L)+(1−p(e))Vs −ψ(e).T h e ﬁrst order condition yields
p0(e∗)L + ψ0(e∗)=0 . Hence, when the buyer can observe the potential liability, the ﬁrst
best is achieved.
2.2 Seller Oﬀer Model
Let us come back to the original assumption that, at t =3 , the seller knows the future
liability but the buyer does not. When the seller has the power to make a take-it-leave-it
oﬀer to the buyer, she will oﬀer either Vb or Vb − L.A n y o ﬀer between Vb and Vb − L
and below Vb − L is strictly dominated by Vb − L,a n da n yo ﬀer larger than Vb is strictly
dominated by Vb. Suppose the buyer accepts the oﬀer of Vb with probability r and the
oﬀer of Vb − L with probability q.W e w i l l ﬁrst ﬁnd a separating equilibrium, where the
seller with value Vs − L oﬀers Vb − L and the Vs seller oﬀers Vb. To have a separation, we
must have q>r , since otherwise, both types of seller will strictly prefer to oﬀer Vb.T h e
following proposition demonstrates that in the separating equilibrium, we have two types
of ineﬃciencies: not all acquisitions take place, even though the gains from the acquisition
is common knowledge, and the seller takes ineﬃc i e n t l yl o wl e v e lo fp r e c a u t i o n .
Proposition 1 In the most eﬃcient separating equilibrium, q =1and r = Vb−Vs
Vb−Vs+L.T h e
seller’s equilibrium eﬀort is strictly lower than the ﬁrst best: e<e ∗.
Proof. Consider the seller with value Vs.I f s h e o ﬀers Vb, her expected proﬁti s
given by E(πs|Vb)=rVb +( 1− r)Vs. Similarly, E(πs|Vb − L)=q(Vb − L)+( 1− q)(Vs).
When the seller’s value is Vs − L, E(πs|Vb)=rVb +( 1− r)(Vs − L) and E(πs|Vb − L)=
q(Vb − L)+( 1− q)(Vs − L). To get the separation, we need
rVb +( 1− r)Vs ≥ q(Vb − L)+( 1− q)(Vs)
rVb +( 1− r)(Vs − L) ≤ q(Vb − L)+( 1− q)(Vs − L)
3which simplify to
r ≥









Vb−Vs+L,w ec a nﬁnd r that satisﬁes both inequalities. Although there
are many diﬀerent equilibria, in the most eﬃcient equilibrium, we must have q =1and
r = Vb−Vs
Vb−Vs+L.
In the equilibrium, buyer makes zero proﬁts. For the seller, as of t =1 ,
E(πs)=p(e)(Vb − L)+( 1− p(e))
µ
Vb − Vs
Vb − Vs + L
Vb +
L












(Vb − Vs)Vb + LVs
Vb − Vs + L
¶
− Lp0(e) − ψ0(e)=0








To achieve the separation, even in the most eﬃcient separating equilibrium, the buyer
must reject the seller’s higher oﬀer (Vb) with a positive probability (r<1), so that the seller
with a lower valuation will not mimic the seller with the higher valuation. Not all mergers
take place, even though the positive gains from the merger, even after taking into account
of the liability, is common knowledge. The seller, despite her full bargaining power, cannot
gain all the beneﬁts of the merger due to the buyer’s positive probability of rejection. The
seller’s expected proﬁt is strictly lower than in the ﬁrst best. Since the total surplus is less,
the seller’s incentive to exert the eﬀort is also lower. The reduction in welfare, compared
to the ﬁrst best case, is
Can the court somehow adjust the size of the liability to induce a better equilibrium,
i.e., provide more incentive to the seller and/or increase the probability of merger? First,
we examine the possibility of adjusting the damages only on the buyer, the successor cor-
poration. That is, if the buyer acquires the company and the victim discovers the damage
and sues for compensation, the court imposes the damages of L + m on the buyer, where
m, the liability adjustor determined by the court, can be either negative or positive. On
the other hand, if there is no acquisition and the seller is found liable, the seller will only
be liable for L.
4Proposition 2 W h e nt h ev i c t i md i s c o v e r st h ed a m a g eo fL and sues the surviving company,
suppose the court can impose a damages of L + m against the buyer if the seller has sold
the company, while imposing L on the seller in case of no sale. As m gets larger, the
acquisition probability decreases and the seller takes more precaution.
Proof. Now, the seller oﬀers either Vb − L − m or Vb. Consider the seller with value
Vs.I f s h e o ﬀers Vb, her expected proﬁti sg i v e nb yE(πs|Vb)=rVb +( 1− r)Vs. Similarly,
E(πs|Vb − L − m)=q(Vb − L − m)+( 1− q)Vs. When the seller’s value is Vs − L,
E(πs|Vb)=rVb +(1−r)(Vs −L) and E(πs|Vb −L−m)=q(Vb −L−m)+(1−q)(Vs −L).
As before, to have the separation, we need
r ≥
q(Vb − Vs − L − m)
Vb − Vs
r ≤
q(Vb − Vs − m)





Vb−Vs+L.I n t h e m o s t e ﬃcient equilibrium,
q =1and r = Vb−Vs−m
Vb−Vs+L. Foremost, we can immediately see that dr
dm < 0, i.e., higher liability
reduces the equilibrium acquisition probability.
For the seller, as of t =1 ,
E(πs)=p(e)(Vb − L − m)+( 1− p(e))
µ
Vb − Vs − m
Vb − Vs + L
Vb +
L + m









Vb − m −
(Vb − Vs − m)Vb + LVs
Vb − Vs + L
¶
− Lp0(e) − ψ0(e)=0
Let e00 be the solution. Compared to the ﬁrst best, e00 <e ∗ becausep0(e)
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0.W h e n m>0, compared to the case where m =0 ,w em u s th a v ee00 >e 0,s i n c e
Vb −
(Vb−Vs)Vb+LVs
Vb−Vs+L >V b − m −
(Vb−Vs−m)Vb+LVs
Vb−Vs+L .
With the higher liability on the buyer, seller decreases the oﬀer price from Vb − L to
Vb − L − m, which, in turn, translates to a lower proﬁt to the seller. To induce the liable
seller to oﬀer the low acquisition price, i.e., to achieve separation, the buyer now has to
reject the high oﬀer more often than before to make the high oﬀer less attractive. The
acquisition probability decreases. At the same time, since the seller makes a lower proﬁt
in case she is liable, she has a bigger incentive to reduce that contingency. The deterrence
incentive goes up. In short, there is a trade-oﬀ: higher liability on the buyer worsens
the merger ineﬃciency while improving the deterrence eﬃciency. Can the court somehow
get away from this trade-oﬀ and simultaneously achieve both objectives? The following
proposition shows that imposing a higher damages only on the surviving seller is better
than imposing higher damages on the buyer.
5Proposition 3 W h e nt h ev i c t i md i s c o v e r st h ed a m a g eo fL and sues the surviving company,
suppose the court can impose a damages of L + m against the seller if the seller has not
sold the company, while imposing L on the buyer in case of sale. As m gets larger, both
the acquisition probability and the seller’s incentive to take precaution increase.
Proof. Consider a seller with value Vs.I f s h e o ﬀers Vb, her expected proﬁti sg i v e nb y
E(πs|Vb)=rVb +( 1− r)Vs.I f s h e o ﬀers Vb − L, E(πs|Vb − L)=q(Vb − L)+( 1− q)Vs.
When the seller’s value is Vs−L−m,o ﬀering Vb yields E(πs|Vb)=rVb+(1−r)(Vs−L−m),
while oﬀering Vb−L yields E(πs|Vb−L−m)=q(Vb−L)+(1−q)(Vs−L−m).T o a c h i e v e
separation, we need
r ≥
q(Vb − Vs − m)
Vb − Vs
r ≤
q(Vb − Vs + m)
Vb − Vs + L + m
In the most eﬃcient equilibrium, q =1and r = Vb−Vs+m
Vb−Vs+L+m.N o t e , ﬁrst, that dr
dm =
L
(Vb−Vs+L+m)2 > 0. Higher damages increases the equilibrium acquisition probability.
For the seller, as of t =1 ,
E(πs)=p(e)(Vb − L)+( 1− p(e))
µ
Vb − Vs + m
Vb − Vs + L + m
Vb +
L











Vb − Vs + L + m
¶
− Lp0(e) − ψ0(e)=0






0.W h e n m>0, compared to the case where m =0 ,w em u s th a v ee000 >e 0,s i n c e
Vb −
(Vb−Vs)Vb+LVs
Vb−Vs+L >V b −
L(Vb−Vs)
Vb−Vs+L+m.
The reason the higher liability on the surviving seller can improve both merger and
deterrence eﬃciencies is that when the seller knows that she will be liable in the future
for L + m, she becomes more apprehensive about oﬀering Vb to the buyer and facing the
possibility of rejection. This makes it easier for the buyer to distinguish between the
two types and allows him to reduce the high oﬀer rejection probability, i.e., increase the
acquisition probability. On the deterrence side, since the seller now makes a strictly lower
proﬁt when she becomes liable for a larger damages, she has a bigger incentive to avoid that
liability.
62.3 Buyer Oﬀer Model
Suppose, at t =3 , the buyer makes a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer to the seller. Since the buyer’s
value can only be either Vb or Vb − L, the buyer will only consider oﬀers of Vs or Vs − L.
Any oﬀer between Vs and Vs −L is strictly dominated by Vs −L.A n y o ﬀer larger than Vs
is strictly dominated by Vs,a n da n yo ﬀer less than Vs − L is strictly dominated by Vs − L.
The following proposition shows that there will be three possible equilibria and, as in the
seller-oﬀer model, the ﬁrst best is no longer feasible. The second best will depend on the
relative size of the merger gain (Vb − Vs) to the size of the liability (L).
Proposition 4 Let Vb−Vs
Vb−Vs+L ≡ α.W h e n α <p (e∗) <p (0), buyer only makes an oﬀer of
Vs−L and the seller chooses the optimal level of precaution (e = e∗). When p(e∗) <p (0) <
α, buyer only makes an oﬀer of Vs and the seller makes no precautionary eﬀort (e =0 ).
Finally, when p(e∗) < α <p (0),b u y e rm a k e sa no ﬀer of Vs − L with probability q and an
oﬀer of Vs with probability 1 − q, while the seller chooses e∗ with probability r and 0 with
probability 1 − r,w h e r er =
p(0)(Vb−Vs+L)−(Vb−Vs)
(p(0)−p(e∗))(Vb−Vs+L) and q =
ψ(e∗)−ψ(0)
L(p(0)−p(e∗)).
Proof. Suppose the buyer oﬀers Vs−L with probability q and Vs with probability 1−q,
while the seller chooses e∗ with probability r and 0 with probability 1−r. From the buyer’s
perspective, if he oﬀers Vs−L, since the seller will accept the oﬀer only when e L = L and the
buyer’s proﬁt,when the seller accepts, is Vb−Vs, E(πb|Vs−L)=( rp(e∗)+(1−r)p(0))(Vb−Vs).
Similarly, when the buyer oﬀers Vs, E(πb|Vs)=( rp(e∗)+(1−r)p(0))(Vb −Vs −L)+(r(1−
p(e∗))+(1−r)(1−p(0)))(Vb−Vs).S i n c e Vb−Vs−L>0,b o t ho ﬀers yield strictly positive
proﬁts (neither oﬀer is dominated by no oﬀer).
On the other hand, regardless of r, the buyer will strictly prefer oﬀering Vs −L over Vs
(Vs is strictly dominated) if E(πb|Vs − L) >E (πb|Vs), which is equivalent to, rp(e∗)+( 1−
r)p(0) > Vb−Vs
Vb−Vs+L.S i n c e p(0) >p (e∗), this inequality is satisﬁed when p(e∗) > Vb−Vs
Vb−Vs+L.
Conversely, if p(0) < Vb−Vs
Vb−Vs+L, the buyer strictly prefers to oﬀer Vs to Vs − L. Therefore,
when p(e∗) > Vb−Vs
Vb−Vs+L, buyer would only oﬀer Vs − L (q =1 ) ,a n dt h es e l l e rw i l lc h o o s ee
to maximize E(πs)=p(e)(Vs − L)+( 1− p(e))Vs − ψ(e),i . e . ,s e te = e∗. Similarly, when
p(0) < Vb−Vs
Vb−Vs+L, buyer will only oﬀer Vs and the seller will choose e =0 .
When p(e∗) < Vb−Vs
Vb−Vs+L <p (0), there does not exist any pure strategy equilibrium.
I ft h es e l l e rw e r et oc h o o s ee∗, p(e∗) < Vb−Vs
Vb−Vs+L implies that, conditional on e = e∗,t h e
buyer would strictly prefer to oﬀer Vs, which, in turn, implies that the seller should set
e =0 . The case for e =0is similar. To ﬁnd the mixed strategy equilibrium, we need
E(πb|Vs − L)=E(πb|Vs),o r
(rp(e∗)+( 1− r)p(0))(Vb − Vs)
=( rp(e∗)+( 1− r)p(0))(Vb − Vs − L)+( r(1 − p(e∗)) + (1 − r)(1 − p(0)))(Vb − Vs).
7Similarly, we need E(πs|e∗)=E(πs|0),o r
p(e∗)(q(Vs − L)+( 1− q)Vs)+( 1− p(e∗))Vs − ψ(e∗)
= p(0)(q(Vs − L)+( 1− q)Vs)+( 1− p(0))Vs − ψ(0).
Simplifying the expressions yield
r =
p(0)(Vb − Vs + L) − (Vb − Vs)





To check that the probabilities are well deﬁned, on r,s i n c e Vb−Vs
Vb−Vs+L <p (0) by assumption,
p(0)(Vb − Vs + L) − (Vb − Vs) > 0.A l s o , p(e∗) < Vb−Vs
Vb−Vs+L implies that (p(0) − p(e∗))(Vb −
Vs + L) >p (0)(Vb − Vs + L) − (Vb − Vs),s ot h a t0 <r<1. Also, from (p(0)L + ψ(0)) <
(p(e∗)L+ψ(e∗)), L(p(0)−p(e∗)) > ψ(e∗)−ψ(0). With ψ(e∗)−ψ(0) > 0,w eh a v e0 <q<1.
The ratio Vb−Vs
Vb−Vs+L (≡ α) can be re-written as 1
1+L/(Vb−Vs),w h e r e L
(Vb−Vs) indicates the
relative size of the liability to the gains from the acquisition. When the size of the gain is
suﬃciently large (p(e∗) <p (0) < α), the buyer would not want to risk that gain by making
al o wo ﬀer (Vs − L). The buyer always acquires the ﬁrm at the high price (Vs), but this
provides no incentive to the seller to take any precaution (e =0 ). Conversely, when the
size of the gain is relatively small, α <p (e∗) <p (0), the buyer is more concerned about
the potential liability. The buyer makes a lower oﬀer (Vs − L) and since the seller makes
no proﬁt from either with or without the acquisition, this provides the optimal incentive
against the seller. In the intermediate range, the two cases are combined.
Proposition 5 W h e nt h ev i c t i md i s c o v e r st h ed a m a g eo fL and sues the surviving company,
suppose the court can impose a damages of L+m against the buyer if the seller has sold the
company, while imposing L on the seller in case of no sale. Imposition of liability of L+m
only on the buyer has no eﬀect on the range of possible equilibria or the seller’s incentive.
When m is suﬃciently large, however, buyer makes no oﬀers in equilibrium.
Proof. With respect to the acquisition price, since the seller’s reservation values have
not changed, the buyer still oﬀers Vs − L with probability q and Vs with probability 1 − q,
while the seller chooses e∗ with probability r and 0 with probability 1 − r. Therefore,
E(πb|Vs−L)=( rp(e∗)+(1−r)p(0))(Vb−Vs−m),a n dE(πb|Vs)=( rp(e∗)+(1−r)p(0))(Vb−
Vs − L − m)+( r(1 − p(e∗)) + (1 − r)(1 − p(0)))(Vb − Vs).
Suppose, for now, that m is suﬃciently small so that Vb−Vs−L−m>0.A s b e f o r e , t h e
buyer will only oﬀer Vs −L if E(πb|Vs −L) >E (πb|Vs). After some algebra, the buyer will
8strictly prefer Vs −L to Vs when p(e∗) > Vb−Vs
Vb−Vs+L and will strictly prefer Vs to Vs −L when
p(0) < Vb−Vs
Vb−Vs+L. Note that the inequality is independent of r, q, and, most importantly,
m. Compared to the previous case, the buyer’s preferences remain unchanged. As before,
conditional on the buyer’s oﬀers, when p(e∗) > Vb−Vs
Vb−Vs+L, the seller will set e = e∗,a n d
when p(0) < Vb−Vs
Vb−Vs+L, the seller will choose e =0 . With respect to the mixed strategy
equilibrium, when p(e∗) < Vb−Vs
Vb−Vs+L <p (0), the buyer and the seller will mix with the same
probabilities of q and r as before. Therefore, the three regions of equilibria are the same
as before.
Now, let us examine what will happen to the respective equilibrium as m rises. Suppose,
ﬁrst, p(e∗) > Vb−Vs
Vb−Vs+L and e = e∗,s ot h a tE(πb|Vs − L)=p(e∗)(Vb − Vs − m) >E (πb|Vs).
Since the buyer prefers to oﬀer Vs − L to Vs regardless of m,s ol o n ga sm<V b − Vs,
the buyer will only oﬀer Vs − L.W h e n m>V b − Vs, the buyer will make no oﬀers,
since 0 >E (πb|Vs − L) >E (πb|Vs). Similarly, when p(0) < Vb−Vs
Vb−Vs+L and e =0 ,s i n c e
E(πb|Vs)=p(0)(Vb − Vs − L − m)+( 1− p(0))(Vb − Vs) >E (πb|Vs − L),a sl o n ga sm is
smaller than Vb−Vs
p(0) −L, the buyer will only make the oﬀer of Vs.W h e n m>Vb−Vs
p(0) −L,t h e
buyer makes no oﬀers. With respect to the mixed strategy equilibrium, we know that the
buyer is indiﬀerent between Vs and Vs −L regardless of m.H e n c e , s o l o n g a s m<V b −Vs,
the buyer will mix between the two oﬀers, and when m>V b − Vs, the buyer will make no
oﬀers. The seller’s strategies are comparable.
When the damages is adjusted only against the buyer, so long as there are acquisitions
in equilibrium, a change in m has no eﬀect on welfare because it does not aﬀect either the
buyer’s or the seller’s reservation values. Since the adjustment doesn’t apply to the seller,
the seller’s reservation values are unaﬀected. With respect to the buyer, conditional on e,
when the buyer oﬀers Vs − L, the buyer acquires the company only when the liability is
high and in case of acquisition, the buyer will be liable for additional amount of m. Hence,
the buyer’s proﬁt is decreased by p·m. Similarly, if the buyer oﬀers Vs, while acquisition is
consummated with certainty, the buyer knows that he will be liable for additional m with
probability p, thus reducing the buyer’s proﬁtb yp·m. In both cases, therefore, conditional
on e, the buyer’s proﬁt decreases by p · m, and the buyer’s preferences over one oﬀer over
the other remains unchanged.
Next, we consider the case of adjusting the liability only on the surviving seller. That
is, if the seller does not accept the buyer’s oﬀer and the victim discovers the damage
and sues for compensation, the seller must pay L + m to the victim, whereas in the case
when the buyer has bought the seller’s company, the buyer will only be liable for L.I n
contrast to the previous case, adjusting the surviving seller’s liability has a direct eﬀect on
the seller’s reservation values, and given our setting of buyer making a take-it-or-leave-it
oﬀer, changing the seller’s reservation values aﬀects the equilibrium acquisition price and
precautionary eﬀort.
9Proposition 6 When the victim discovers the damage and sues the surviving company,
suppose the court can impose a damages of L+m on the seller if the seller has not sold, while
imposing L on the buyer when the company has been sold. As m gets larger, the acquisition
probability decreases and the seller takes more precaution, while as m gets smaller, the
acquisition probability rises while the seller takes less precaution.
Proof (Incomplete). The seller’s reservation values are either Vs − L − m or Vs.
Suppose the buyer makes an oﬀer of Vs − L− m with probability q and an oﬀer of Vs with
probability 1 − q. Similarly, the seller sets e = e∗∗ with probability r and e =0with
probability 1 − r.T h e n , E(πb|Vs − L − m)=( rp(e∗∗)+( 1− r)p(0))(Vb − Vs + m),a n d
E(πb|Vs)=( rp(e∗∗)+(1−r)p(0))(Vb−Vs−L)+(r(1−p(e∗∗))+(1−r)(1−p(0)))(Vb−Vs).
Now, the buyer will strictly prefer to oﬀer Vs−L−m to Vs when p(e∗∗) < Vb−Vs
Vb−Vs+L+m and
will strictly prefer Vs to Vs − L− m when p(0) < Vb−Vs
Vb−Vs+L+m.W h e n p(e∗∗) > Vb−Vs
Vb−Vs+L+m,
the seller will choose e∗∗ to maximizes E(πs)=p(e)(Vs − L − m)+( 1− p(e))Vs. Note
that e∗∗ >e ∗ and p(e∗∗) <p (e∗). Similarly, when p(0) < Vb−Vs
Vb−Vs+L+m, the seller sets
e =0 .W h e n p(e∗∗) < Vb−Vs






When the buyer oﬀers Vs − L − m, the buyer knows that it will only attract the high
liability seller (e L = L) and since the extra liability is already taken into account in the
merger price, the buyer makes a gain of Vb − Vs + m. On the other hand, if the buyer
oﬀers Vs,w h i l et h eo ﬀer will attract both types of sellers, the buyer knows that it might be
liable for L in the future. This makes the high price oﬀer (Vs) less attractive compared to
t h ec a s ew h e nm =0 ,a n d ,i ne q u i l i b r i u m ,t h ea v e r a g eo ﬀer price will decrease. The lower
average acquisition price implies that it is more likely that the seller won’t sell to the buyer
and hence bear the future liability. This provides more incentive to the seller to take more
precaution. Hence, the court must make a trade-oﬀ between foregone merger gains and
sub-optimal precautionary incentive.
10References
[1]A r n e s s ,J . ,S u t i n ,A .a n dP l o t k i n ,T .( 1989), “Preventing Successor Liability for De-
fective Products: Safeguards for Acquiring Corporations,” Washington University Law
Quarterly 67, 535.
[2] Gilson, R. and Black, B. (1995), The Law and Finance of Corporate Acquisitions,2 n d
edition, Foundation Press, Westbury, New York.
[3] Green, M. (1986), “Successor Liability: Supermajority of Statutory Reform to Protect
Products Liability Claimants,” Cornell Law Review 72, 17.
[4] Kraakman, R. (1984), “Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs of Legal Controls,”
Yale Law Journal 93, 857.
[5] Phillips, D. (1982), “Products Liability of Successor Corporations: A Corporate and
Commercial Law Perspective,” NYU Law Review 58, 906.
[6] Roe, M. (1984), “Mergers, Acquisitions, and Tort: A Comment on the Problem of
Successor Corporate Liability,” Vanderbilt Law Review 70, 1559.
[7] Schwartz, A. (1985), “Products Liability, Corporate Structure and Bankruptcy: Toxic
Substances and the Remote Risk Relationship,” Journal of Legal Studies 14, 689.
11